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Soviet Spokesman Explains Far East Arms Cut
OW0607023289 Beijing XINHUA in English
0127 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, July 4 (XINHUA)—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said today that 50,000 Soviet troops to be pulled back from Mongolia will be included in the plan to cut 200,000 of its troops from the eastern Soviet Union.

Yuriy Gremitskikh said the move was part of the decision announced May 28 by Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov to withdraw 50,000 Soviet troops and 11,000 pieces of military hardware from Mongolia this year and next.

The spokesman also said that the Soviet pledge to withdraw 120,000 of its 579,600 troops stationed in the Far East is to be carried out in its military regions of the Far East and the Outer-Baykal and its Pacific Fleet.

Sixteen warships from the Pacific Fleet are to be scrapped from 1989 to 1990, Gremitskikh said.

He added that by June 1 the country had destroyed 51.1 percent of its total shorter- and medium-ranged nuclear missiles and 44.6 percent of their launchers as part of its implementation of the 1987 Moscow-Washington accord on halving their intermediate-range nuclear arsenals.

INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

ASEAN Foreign Ministers Back Regional Peace, Nuclear-Free Zones

Communique Issued

BK0407112189 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
0922 GMT 4 Jul 89

[By Zainoor Sulaiman]

[Excerpts] Bandar Seri Begawan, July 4 (OANA-BERNAMA)—ASEAN foreign ministers, who ended their 22nd annual meeting here Tuesday [4 July], called on Vietnam and the Kampuchean factions to continue to exercise flexibility and to be more accommodating to reach a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. [passage omitted]

With the prospects of the settlement of the Kampuchean problem in sight, the foreign ministers reaffirmed ASEAN's determination to work towards the realisation of the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia.

They reiterated the decision of the 3rd ASEAN summit (in December 1987) to draw up an appropriate strategy with clear targets and objectives to demonstrate progress towards early realisation of ZOPFAN, the communique said.

They directed senior officials to continue considering the concept of a Southeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone (SEANWFZ) as a component of ZOPFAN, with a view to completing a draft treaty as soon as possible.

The ministers agreed that ASEAN could undertake consultations, at an appropriate time, with other states on primary elements of the SEANWFZ for the purpose of obtaining their support for the proposed zone. [passage omitted]

AFP Reports on Communique

BK0407052089 Hong Kong AFP in English
0456 GMT 4 Jul 89

[Excerpts] Bandar Seri Begawan, July 4 (AFP)—Foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) approved a 30-page joint communique at the end of their two-day annual meeting here Tuesday [4 July].

ASEAN brings together the non-communist countries of the region—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

Key points of the communique: [passage omitted]

ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ

The ministers stressed their continued commitment to achieving a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the region and asked senior officials to consider the concept of a Southeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone (SEANWFZ) as a component of ZOPFAN. [passage omitted]

PHILIPPINES

Officials Dispute Question of Nuclear Weapons at U.S. Bases

HK0307071189 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER in English 3 Jul 89 pp 1, 10

[Text] Dumaguete City—The United States has been keeping nuclear weapons inside its military bases here for the past 23 years, Senate President Jovito Salonga said yesterday.

In an interview on government television, Salonga said the presence of nuclear arms in the bases was confirmed in a cable sent by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to U.S. Ambassador to Manila William Blair in 1966. The cable read: "Please advise President (Ferdinand) Marcos that we are now storing nuclear weapons in the bases."

The Constitution declares freedom from nuclear weapons a national policy, and the Senate has passed a bill banning the storage of such arms anywhere in the country.

Under the RP [Republic of the Philippines]-U.S. Military Bases Agreement, the United States is required to notify Philippine officials about the presence of nuclear weapons at Clark air base, Subic naval base and four other smaller installations.

But President Aquino has said she had not been notified by U.S. authorities that such weapons were being stored on the bases.

On the basis of this documentary evidence, Salonga said the presence of nuclear arms in the Philippines is "not a matter of belief but a matter of record in the United States."

"It is a fact that I cannot dispute," he added in the interview held after he delivered the Sunday sermon at the Siliman University chapel here.

Salonga's revelation contradicted statements made by top defense officials denying the presence of nuclear arms in the bases.

Brig. Gen. Demetrio Camua, chief of the Clark Air Base Command, said last month he was convinced no nuclear weapons were being stored at Clark air base.

"I am satisfied with what I have seen and there is no reason for alarm and anxiety," Camua said after a tour of restricted areas on the base.

Defense Secretary V. Fidel Ramos was less definite about denying the presence of nuclear arms, but said he doubted it "very much" since land-based missiles stored in underground silos "have been overtaken by new war developments."

Meanwhile, an international peace organization yesterday demanded the complete pullout of U.S. military facilities from the Asia-Pacific region.

In a press statement the Asia-Pacific Forum on Peace and Development asked the U.S. and other global powers to stop using the region as a "huge nuclear storage and waste dump."

The group, which has members in the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and several other countries, said the presence of U.S. bases in the region increases the "potential for confrontation" among the superpowers and contributes to the destruction of its natural resources.

The group said it plans to hold demonstrations in 34 cities to protest the continued U.S. military presence in the region on July 4 when Americans celebrate Independence Day.

THAILAND

Delegation Attends Soviet Naval Exercise

*BK0407095989 Bangkok Voice of Free Asia in English
1500 GMT 3 Jul 89*

[Text] A Royal Thai Navy delegation will leave for the Soviet Union this weekend to observe a naval exercise, a senior Navy officer said yesterday. Leading the Thai delegation is Rear Admiral Thanong Sirirangsi, chief of the Navy's Landing Ship Division, according to Admiral Sawet Tapthong, Navy chief of staff. The Soviet Union's naval exercise will take place between 10 and 12 July in the open sea, northwest of Japan, said the officer. The maneuver will demonstrate the operations of three nuclear-powered submarines, 20 cruisers, 37 aircraft, and about 1,000 navymen, he said. In addition to the Thai military delegation, representatives from the United States, Canada, China, Japan, Australia and several other countries will also observe the naval exercise, he said.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

CSSR Delegate Outlines Pact CFE 'Alternative Solution' on Zones

AU0407170589 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
30 Jun 89 p 7

[CTK report: "The New Warsaw Pact Proposal Is Submitted; The Speech by the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation in Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna—On Thursday [29 June] Ladislav Balcar, head of the Czechoslovak delegation, addressed the Vienna talks on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE]. On behalf of the Warsaw Pact member states, he referred to the possibility of an alternative solution to the question of dividing territory from the Atlantic to the Urals into four zones, including a reduction in the numbers of tactical strike aircraft, combat helicopters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery.

The central European part of the zone on the Warsaw Pact side would include the GDR, Poland, the CSSR, Hungary, and the Baltic, Belorussian, Transcarpathian, and Kiev Military Districts. On the NATO side this zone would include Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the FRG, France, and Great Britain. After a reduction, 910,000 troops, 1,120 strike aircraft, 1,250 combat helicopters, 13,300 tanks, 11,500 artillery pieces, and 20,750 armored personnel carriers would be situated in this zone on each side.

Northern Europe would include the northern part of the Leningrad Military District and Norway. Here, after reductions, each side would have at its disposal 20,000 troops, 30 strike aircraft, 30 combat helicopters, 200 tanks, 1,000 artillery pieces, and 150 armored personnel carriers.

Romania, Bulgaria, and the Odessa, North Caucasian, and Transcaucasian Military Districts, Italy, Greece, and Turkey would belong to the southern part of Europe. After reductions, 270,000 troops, 290 strike aircraft, 360 combat helicopters, 5,200 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 5,750 armored personnel carriers would remain in this zone on each side.

Finally, the southern part of the Leningrad Military District, and the Moscow, Volga, and Urals Military Districts, and also Spain, Portugal, and Iceland would belong to the rearward region of Europe. Here, after a reduction by both sides, 150,000 troops, 60 strike aircraft, 60 combat helicopters, 1,300 tanks, 3,000 artillery pieces, and 1,350 armored personnel carriers would remain.

This alternative to the regional division and to fixing sublevels does not mean, however, that the Warsaw Pact member states are abandoning their original proposals which were submitted by the Bulgarian and GDR delegations on 25-30 May of this year. It confirms the efforts

by the socialist states to seek a flexible, compromising point of view which could lead to the accelerated resolution of this complicated problem.

BULGARIA

Defense Minister Queried on Military Reductions

AU0507113489 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
27 Jun 89 pp 56-58

[Interview with Dobri Marinov Dzhurov, minister of national defense, by Miroslav Lazanski—date and place not given]

[Excerpts] The Bulgarian Government recently announced that it will reduce its armed forces by 10,000 soldiers, 200 tanks, 200 artillery systems, 20 planes, and 5 naval units, as well as that it will reduce its military budget by 12 percent. "This step of ours points to the fact that there have been some significant changes in the international situation during the last few years," Todor Zhivkov said, adding: "Our initiatives are aimed at transferring the focus of national security buildup from military to political factors." What does the Bulgarian Army with its about 160,000 people, 2,500 tanks, and 255 fighter planes think about all this?

My questions were answered by Army General Dobri Marinov Dzhurov, minister of national defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, a general who currently holds a world record in the length of his term of office as minister: He has been occupying the post of the minister of national defense since February 1962, longer than any current defense minister in the world.

[Lazanski] Comrade general, is the Bulgarian military budget proportionate to the size of the country and the number of its citizens, because, reckoned as a percentage, that is, relatively, Bulgaria earmarks for the Army more than Hungary and Romania do? Is about 7 percent of the gross national product of Bulgaria earmarked for defense?

[Dzhurov] The Army budget of every country in the Warsaw Pact is established not only on the basis of its population and size, but also on the basis of its military-strategic position. That budget contains various components. In some countries it includes funds for maintaining the Army, for armament and other combat technology, and for some other needs. In some other countries, however, it includes only the funds for maintaining the Army. Data on how individual countries ensure material funds for maintaining their Armies differ essentially. It is therefore difficult to compare different countries' military budgets simply by comparing the percentage of their national incomes the budget takes.

[Lazanski] What is the Bulgarian view concerning the future of military blocs?

[Dzhurov] Bulgaria is against the division of Europe into antagonistic military blocs. We advocate the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the first step there is disarmament. The future of the military blocs will depend on precisely established new political stances in the international relations. We advocate military balance through gradual disarmament and have already reduced our military potential considerably. We have reduced the numerical size of the Army, the number of tanks, artillery systems, and fighter planes, as well as the Army budget. We expect our partners, NATO, to make similar steps. At the same time, we are concerned about the trend toward modernizing conventional and strategic armament of NATO advocated by some circles in the West, all of which is a result of anachronistic concepts dating back from the times of the "cold war." We are against the approach from the position of force and against the mania of "superiority" which prevails in the minds of some people in the West.

[Lazanski] What is the stance of the People's Republic of Bulgaria as regards cooperation in the Balkans and the nuclear-free zone in the region?

[Dzhurov] The Belgrade meeting of the foreign ministers of Balkan countries resulted in a united and constructive dialogue based on the principles of mutual respect, noninterference in internal affairs, mutual cooperation, all of which is in conformity with the lasting interests of our peoples. Such a cooperation is full support for the new spirit in political thinking and the current tendency of developing international relations in Europe and in the world. It is in this context that we view the problem of establishing mutual confidence and security in the Balkans and realizing the initiative of turning the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone and a zone free from chemical weapons. We believe that this will contribute even more to arriving at a global solution to the question of destroying the means for mass killing.

[Lazanski] The West claims that the Soviet Union can use the ports of Burgas and Varna to disembark its troops and weapons in a possible war. Is that true?

[Dzhurov] Our country is against war, but if it is attacked, it will take advantage of its harbors and ports as any sovereign country would in order to perform defense tasks together with its allies.

[Lazanski] Are there any Soviet units in the People's Republic of Bulgaria?

There are constant speculations about that in the West....

[Dzhurov] There were Soviet units in Bulgaria after World War II because Bulgarian state bodies wanted that. However, they left in 1947.

[Lazanski] It was said in the past that Bulgaria is the "policeman" of the Balkans. How would you comment on that?

[Dzhurov] Socialist Bulgaria has never carried out a dictatorial or aggressive policy. We do not interfere in other countries' internal affairs. Bulgarian foreign policy is guided by the principles of good-neighborliness, sovereign equality, respect for territorial integrity, and independence.

We support our government's initiative of turning the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone and a region without chemical weapons. A country making such initiatives cannot be called a "gendarme" of the Balkans. [passage omitted]

[Lazanski] What is Bulgarian military doctrine like and where do its determinants lie? To what extent is that an originally Bulgarian defense concept?

[Dzhurov] Our military doctrine reflects the peaceful and constructive policy Bulgaria has on the Balkans. It has a defensive character and its essence is as follows: Bulgaria will never and under no conditions undertake military actions, irrespective of other countries, in the Balkans or in Europe, unless it becomes the object of a military attack itself. We are developing our Armed Forces in conformity with this and our Armed Forces guarantee a life in peace to our people. The main branch of our Army is the infantry, but we are also developing air force, navy, and air defense units. Our military doctrine envisages combat readiness and comprehensive preparations of armed forces at the level which ensures counteractions against a possible aggression and, if ordered, cooperation with fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact too, using respective operations in order to carry out a destructive resistance against an enemy. The main characteristic of the military-technical side of our military doctrine is relying on the world experience in military buildup and adapting it to our specific conditions. Defense in Bulgaria, just as in the Warsaw Pact member countries, is based upon the principle of "reasonable sufficiency." This means that they strive for the reduction of the numerical size of the armed forces of all countries and coalitions and for the reduction of the possibility of a military confrontation on both sides in order to be able to remove suspicions and inclinations toward a one-sided advantage to the greatest possible extent. [passage omitted]

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Politburo Report to Central Committee Plenum
AU2806060189 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 23 Jun 89 pp 3-9

["From the Politburo Report to the Eighth Session of the SED Central Committee; Rapporteur: Joachim Herrmann, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee"]

[Excerpts]

Dear comrades:

Since the 12th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] was convened by the seventh Central Committee session, our party has done great work. This work was outlined in the speech given by our general secretary, Comrade Erich Honecker, with its basic guidelines for all questions of domestic and foreign policy, for the further shaping of the developed socialist society in the GDR, and the safeguarding of peace. [passage omitted]

Important Initiatives and Advance Moves of Socialism for Disarmament and Detente

Comrades, if one looks back at the period since the seventh Central Committee session, the statement by our general secretary has confirmed that a number of positive changes can be seen in international relations and that a change from confrontation toward detente has been initiated. Now this process has to be continued with determination, it must be made irreversible. This is all the more important in view of the intensified activities of those politicians in the West who still stick to the position of "nuclear deterrence" and at the same time are interfering more openly than ever before in the internal affairs of the socialist countries.

The positive developments in the international situation—as expressed by the Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, by the beginning of the Vienna negotiations conventional disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, and by progress in settling some regional conflicts through political means—are the result of the dynamic foreign policy course of the USSR, the GDR, and the other socialist states, the activities of those states and social forces in the world that are guided by reason and realism. However, because of the efforts to the contrary by influential NATO forces to achieve military superiority and confrontation, the international situation remains complicated and contradictory.

During the period under review, the Warsaw Pact states again initiated numerous disarmament initiatives and made unprecedented advances so as not to halt the disarmament process.

In connection with the data on the numerical strength of the armed forces and armaments of both military coalitions in Europe and the adjacent seas, which was published by the Warsaw Pact states at the end of January, the readiness was again confirmed to work in line with the defensive character of our military doctrine for a speedy considerably reduction in the level of military balance until an inability to attack is achieved on both sides. This is the aim of the concrete proposals presented by our alliance at the Vienna negotiations, which envisage a radical reduction in the armaments and armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to agreed equal

ceilings, while taking into consideration those categories which are especially suited for surprise attacks and large-scale attack operations.

GDR Fulfills Its Contribution to Peace

At an exposed location in Europe the GDR is making its active contribution to the disarmament process without a break. In January the GDR National Defense Council decided to reduce the National People's Army by 10,000 men, 600 tanks, and 50 planes by 1990—unilaterally and independent of negotiations. The National People's Army will be given an even more strictly defensive character. This includes the disbanding of six tank regiments and one plane squadron. Already in April the first units in Tank Regiment 8 in Goldberg were disbanded, an event which was attended by domestic and foreign media.

An important step is the decision to use 11,500 army members, after brief military training, in focal areas of the national economy for the duration of their active military service and to promote the further dynamic development of the GDR, while ensuring our country's defensive strength.

Our initiatives to establish a nuclear-free and a chemical-weapon-free zone at the dividing line between NATO and Warsaw Pact remain topical.

Dear comrades, in April, with the proposal to NATO to start separate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the offers for negotiations on disarmament of all kinds of weapons were enriched by an essential element. This important initiative of socialism, which was presented at the Berlin session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states, proceeds from the fact that the danger of a surprise attack or the start of a nuclear conflict cannot be eliminated as long as tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. Only the speedy start of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe parallel to the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces offers a realistic chance to considerably reduce all weapons systems that have the ability to initiate surprise attacks and large-scale attack operations.

The GDR welcomes and supports the USSR's decision to unilaterally shift 500 warheads of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of the allied states to its own territory this year, and its willingness to withdraw all nuclear ammunition from the territories of its allies by 1991, provided that the United States takes a similar step.

NATO Strategy Maintains 'Nuclear Deterrence'

Comrades, the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May pursued the goal of setting down uniform actions by the NATO states in view of the disarmament initiatives of the Warsaw Pact states. Looking at the results of the

summit, one must note that in the approved "overall concept for arms control and disarmament" NATO's striving for military superiority over the Warsaw Pact, the affirmation of the policy of "nuclear deterrence," and an entire bunch of measures for interference in the internal affairs of the socialist states are dominating.

The proposals presented by U.S. President George Bush concerning the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe are a first response to the disarmament offers of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, which constitutes a certain progress compared with the attitude in this field up to now. The readiness to include land-based combat aircraft and combat helicopters in the negotiations is a positive step toward bringing the negotiation concepts of the two military alliances closer together. At the same time, the start of negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles is made dependent on coming to an agreement on an accord at the Vienna negotiations, and nobody knows when this will be reached. This connection harms the disarmament process. In addition, the reequipment of the Lance missiles, which is called a "modernization" is only postponed in view of the fear that this might have a negative effect on the next Bundestag elections in the FRG in 1990. The Brussels decision expressly states that the United States will accelerate its work in research and development for a follow-up system to these missiles. As is known, they are to compensate for the potential threat that is being lost because of the INF Treaty.

NATO's adherence to the obsolete military doctrine concept of "nuclear deterrence," which envisages the first use of nuclear weapons, again demonstrates the policy of military strength, which is the basis of the continuation of the nuclear arms race and shows the adherence to old patterns of thought. The scenario of the "Wintex-Cimex" staff maneuver was also characteristic of this, in which there was a practice release of 30 strikes with nuclear weapons, with the participation of all NATO states.

The soonest possible conclusion of a treaty between the USSR and the United States on the 50-percent reduction of their strategic offensive weapons while adhering to the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and the conclusion of a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons remain the priority tasks. The GDR welcomes the fact that the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on strategic and space weapons in Geneva have been resumed.

The Politburo accepted a briefing by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on his official visit in the FRG. It welcomes the results of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the FRG as an important contribution to preserving and stabilizing peace in Europe. The Joint Statement signed by both countries in Bonn is a document that applies the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems and alliance memberships and can serve further steps on the path toward

European security and cooperation. As Mikhail Gorbachev stressed after his visit, regardless of all ideological and political differences, every policy has to focus on concern for the survival of mankind. War must no longer be a means of politics, one's own security must not be safeguarded at the expense of others.

In concurrence with the policy that it pursues itself, the GDR supports the standpoints mentioned in the statement on deepening and continuing the disarmament process. It accords particular importance to the commitment to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and security of every state, the right of all states to freely chose their social system, and to respect the right to self determination and the norms of international law. The GDR agrees with the positions expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev that the peoples in Europe consider radical disarmament in the conventional field, short-range nuclear systems, and chemical weapons to be in their very own vital interest.

The Politburo stresses its complete concurrence with the official statement issued by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on Mikhail Gorbachev's visit, which stresses the visit's importance for the relations between the USSR and the FRG and, beyond that, for all of Europe. They are part of building the common European home. The official statement of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo that the Joint Statement "further develops the ideas of the Moscow Treaty under the new conditions and is based on the adherence to the order developed during the postwar period and on the inviolability of the borders, is an important contribution to modernizing European and international relations in general"—this statement is unambiguous and does not leave any room for any kind of speculation, not even in Bonn's government statement.

Corresponding to the GDR's peace mission is the will to do everything so that war will never again start from German soil. This is also the guideline for our activities which was set down on the occasion of the commemoration of the beginning of World War II which was unleashed by the Hitler fascists 50 years ago. [passage omitted]

Relations of Peaceful Coexistence Between the GDR and FRG

Comrades, in accordance with the tasks set by the 11th SED Congress, the securing of peace was also at the center of the diverse relations between the GDR and FRG. Since Erich Honecker's official visit to the FRG in September 1987, these relations have in general developed positively. The joint communique laid the foundations for this. In the future, too, all points of this communique must be fulfilled.

In a letter addressed to Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 10 February of this year, Comrade Erich Honecker confirmed that the GDR sees the active promotion of the process of disarmament and detente by both German

states as the core of political dialogue . Lasting security and mutually advantageous cooperation to the benefit of the people are attainable only through a halt to the arms race, unconditional disarmament, genuine confidence-building, and a complete normalization of relations between the countries. [passage omitted]

Dear comrades, on the basis of the interest of both sides in businesslike cooperation between the two German states, Comrade Erich Honecker had talks with the ministers and Senat presidents of the FRG laender of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Lower Saxony. Talks with Bjoern Engholm, Henning Voscherau, and Joannes Rau, were dominated by agreement between the SED and and Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] in questions concerning the safeguarding of peace and the security partnership. The Social Democrat politicians opposed the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons deployed in the FRG and spoke in favor of a third zero-option. In talks with the CDU politicians Lothar Spaeth and Ernst Albrecht it was emphasized that the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons is of vital importance, particularly for the citizens in the two German states.

On 25 May, Erich Honecker received SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel for a further exchange of views on current developments in the international situation and on questions of bilateral relations between the GDR and FRG and relations between the SED and SPD. The annual meeting between representatives of the SED and SPD, which has already become a tradition, confirmed the firm resolve of both parties to continue to proceed along the path of security partnership, dialogue, and cooperation between Communists and Social Democrats in the vital matters of humanity. The GDR will continue to strive to free German soil from ABC [atomic, bacteriological, and chemical] weapons, as Erich Honecker pointed out.

Regarding the document drawn up by the SPD's Basic Values Commission and the Academy for Social Sciences of the SED Central Committee, entitled "The Conflict of Ideologies and Joint Security," there have been many discussions by leading representatives of both parties on questions of security policy. The usefulness of businesslike debates on disarmament was emphasized, and it was also stressed that peaceful coexistence between countries can never mean ideological coexistence. The striving for civilized forms of conflict can never mean convergence of the two social systems, nor any blurring of their fundamental differences. In view of certain speeches, such as that of Mr Eppler in the Bundestag, it is also necessary to clarify that it can only be harmful to the disarmament and security policy if all that is offered are old theories of rolling back socialism that are left over from the Cold War period and presented in new packaging.

The meeting between Comrade Egon Krenz and Oskar Lafontaine, deputy SPD chairman and minister president of Saarland, as well as the talks that Guenther

Mittag held in the FRG during his visit to the Hannover Fair, his meetings with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Economics Minister Haussmann, the chairman of the Free Democratic Party, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, and Oskar Lafontaine served the normalization of relations between the GDR and FRG. [passage omitted]

Further on Nuclear-Free Zones Meeting in Berlin

SED's Axen Addresses Meeting
AU3006090389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 28 Jun 89 p 6

[Report on speech by Hermann Axen, Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, at the opening of a meeting of the International Liaison Office for Nuclear-Free Zones in Berlin on 27 June: "Regional Settlements—a Possibility of How to Struggle Against the Nuclear Arms Race"]

[Excerpt] In his opening speech at the meeting of the International Liaison Office, Hermann Axen pointed out that these discussions are presenting the opportunity for an exchange of experiences on what has been achieved following the meeting in June last year, and what can be done in the future to realize the common goal, to create a world without nuclear weapons.

The GDR welcomes the resumption of Soviet-U.S. talks on strategic offensive weapons with adherence to the ABM Treaty, Hermann Axen stressed. The GDR positively assesses the fact that the signing of the final document of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting has finally made possible the opening of talks on conventional disarmament and the continuation of talks on confidence-building measures.

The supreme maxim of the GDR's foreign policy is, and continues to be, to work purposefully and resourcefully for peace and security. Particularly in the year of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, the citizens of the GDR are remembering the historic lesson, the legacy of over 50 million people who died in the war: War must be prevented before it breaks out!

The GDR Has Launched Disarmament Initiatives of Its Own

In order to enhance the process of disarmament, the GDR, loyal to its antifascist tradition and aware of its obligation to to everything so that war will never again start from German soil, but only peace, has been acting in this spirit in an exposed location in Europe for the past 4 decades.

However, there are still forces that cling to the dangerous cliches of military strength and the striving for military superiority. They continue to hold the view that nuclear deterrence ensures maximum security. And it is this old thinking in categories of deterrence that characterizes the NATO comprehensive concept which was adopted in

Brussels. Whereas the Warsaw Pact is putting into practice its military doctrine, which is aimed at defending peace and security, NATO insists on its aggressive doctrine of deterrence, which continues to include the possibility of nuclear first strikes, Axen emphasized.

Following the international meeting in June 1988, the GDR has launched new disarmament initiatives and taken independent disarmament steps. Disarmament through deeds—this is the guideline of the resolution of the GDR National Defense Council, which is aimed at unilaterally reducing the National People's Army by 10,000 men by 1990, irrespective of talks, and reducing military expenditure by 10 percent. The GDR is carrying out this unilateral disarmament measure despite the fact that the military threat at its western border has by no means decreased.

Brussels Summit Did Not Use Chance

The fact that the Brussels NATO summit finally had to provide an answer to disarmament proposals that had long been submitted by the Warsaw Pact states constitutes a certain progress, Hermann Axen stated. The GDR has already expressed the view that the proposal of U.S. President Bush on conventional disarmament points in the right direction. The proposal submitted by the Warsaw Pact states in April this year to open parallel talks on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual-capable systems, is in keeping with humanistic logic.

The answer that NATO provided at the Brussels summit in reply to our proposal to open talks on tactical nuclear weapons is disappointing, to put it mildly, Axen emphasized. The chance of breaking the vicious circle of "modernization" and "countermodernization" was unfortunately not used by the NATO summit.

The creation of nuclear-free zones is a task and a reality of a global character, Hermann Axen pointed out. The Latin American states and the states of the Pacific Forum are carrying out active work within the framework of their existing nuclear-free zones. They have furnished proof that it is possible to set up nuclear-free zones. The principle of regional solutions works and essentially contributes to international detente and security.

According to information received so far, about 30 specific national meetings and international conferences that dealt with these issues have been held since June of last year, Hermann Axen pointed out. The following can be stated after the first large-scale meeting 1 year ago:

1. The peoples have increasingly become aware that nuclear-free zones exist in various regions.
2. Regional nuclear-free zones support the struggle against nuclear arms race and against the proliferation of these weapons. They are conducive to the global reduction of nuclear weapons systems.

3. Calls are increasing that nuclear weapons be only deployed in countries that possess them and that are capable of using them.

As has long been known, this is also the GDR's position.

On the proposal of last year's international meeting, a liaison office has been established in the GDR after the Berlin meeting. It has set itself the task providing the participants of the Berlin meeting and other interested parties with further information on the progress of political and practical processes in connection with these issues, to establish contacts, and to exchange information and experiences.

The key element on our proposal is to organize meetings at intervals of 1 or 2 years or—if international developments make it necessary—even more often, to exchange views, discuss proposals, and undertake a review of achievements that have been made by mankind to banish the nuclear danger. [passage omitted]

Meeting Concludes

*AU0307170589 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 29 Jun 89 p 2*

[ND report: "Berlin Meeting: Do Not Permit Break in Disarmament Process Now"]

[Text] Berlin—The 2-day meeting of the International Liaison Office for nuclear-free zones in Berlin was successfully concluded on Wednesday evening [28 June]. In a frank and constructive atmosphere, 59 speakers from 37 countries of all continents and of 10 international organizations took stock of the results achieved following the international meeting on nuclear-free zones in June 1988, and discussed new steps.

The lively exchange of views focused on the question of how disarmament and detente can be pushed by national, regional, and international contributions. There was agreement that no break must be permitted in the disarmament process, and that this process must include nuclear as well as conventional weapons.

On the second day, the discussion was chaired by Gerald Goetting, GDR State Council deputy chairman and Christian Democratic Union chairman; Gerhard Lindner, vice president of the GDR Peace Council and deputy chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany; Horst Kreter, vice president of the GDR Peace Council and secretary of the National Democratic Party of Germany Main Committee; and Professor Guenter Drefahl.

In his final statement, the GDR Peace Council president thanked all participants for their substantive contributions. He said that the meeting had proved once again

that it was possible for people of different political, ideological, and religious views, representatives of states, parties, and parliaments, organizations and movements to meet, if and when the ensuring of peace and the prevention of mankind's nuclear self-destruction were at stake. He said that for all regional particular features and traditions, the realization had been accepted worldwide that the creation of nuclear-free zones was an extremely important and necessary step on the road to liberating mankind from the scourge of nuclear weapons.

Professor Drefahl confirmed that the GDR would also continue to meet its political and moral responsibility for peace at the center of Europe in the 40th year of its existence, and, in particular, in view of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II.

POLAND

Further on Soviet Force Withdrawals From Poland

Training Tank Regiment Pulls Out

LD0107133589 Warsaw PAP in English
1256 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Warsaw, July 1—Another unit of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army is leaving Poland.

Soldiers of the training tank regiment held an assembly today for the last time. Two railway shipments with tanks and a motorcade set out to a new location in the Soviet Union.

Regimental Commander Cited

LD0107201889 Warsaw PAP in English
1835 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Jelenia, Gora, July 1—Soldiers of the training tank regiment of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army gathered for their last gala assembly in Strachow today. They are from yet another unit which in line with earlier announcements leaves Poland.

"Today our regiment with all of its equipment is leaving the hospitable Polish land. The regiment has fulfilled its patriotic and internationalistic obligation. We leave in putting into practice the peace initiatives of the leadership of our state which are an important step in the direction of international detente," stated the commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Lezniov.

Said Sergey Rogov, the deputy chief of the Observation Group for the Reduction of Soviet Troops and Arms, a social organization which was set up in the USSR and oversees the process of withdrawing Soviet units from socialist states:

"According to our data, the Soviet Union will have withdrawn over 3 thousand tanks, about 600 artillery guns and 40 planes and about 26 thousand soldiers from socialist states by July 1. The biggest reductions pertain to the Western Group of the Soviet Army stationed in the GDR: Over 1,900 tanks, 180 guns and over 10 thousand people. Apart from the truck battalion which had been pulled out earlier and the tank regiment being withdrawn now, the following will be regrouped from Poland to the Soviet Union: An independent battalion of anti-chemical defence, a anti-airforce missile regiment and a helicopter regiment, all in all 90 tanks, about 50 planes and over 60 helicopters."

INDIA

Editorial Assails U.S. Concern over Agni Missile Program

BK2706115789 Delhi PATRIOT in English
24 May 89 p 4

[Editorial: "After 'Agni'"]

[Text] The successful test-launch of Agni [India's surface-to-surface missile] as the Prime Minister put it, "provides us with a viable non-nuclear option of the greatest relevance to the contemporary strategic doctrines". Simply put, Agni fills a vital gap in the country's strategic requirements and demonstrates India has come of age in indigenous technological development. In terms of technological implications, Agni is in the same genre as the 1974 Pokhran nuclear implosion was. Predictably, like the 1974 underground test, the Agni launch has invited a lot of flak from the West, chiefly the U.S. The American and Pakistani reactions have been sharp. Pakistan Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan has described Agni as a threat not only to regional stability but also to international peace. The U.S. for several weeks now has been at pains to somehow thwart the Agni launch. From expressions of "deep concern" to dark hints about damage to India's developing relations with China and Pakistan to outright threats to Indo-U.S. ties—the U.S. has tried every tactic to dissuade India from developing indigenous missile technology. No such "deep concern" was forthcoming from Washington when Pakistan, and earlier Israel, test-fired their missiles or when China sold its 'East Wind' and 'Silkworms' to Saudi Arabia. The patently anti-Indian colouring of U.S. concerns over missiles proliferation becomes apparent from the U.S. Congress' decision to consider stoppage of technology transfer and trade barriers against developing countries that have or are about to have ballistic missiles. The moves as a U.S. military analyst affirmed, are "clearly to make an example of India." These moves may be followed by a U.S. attempt to set up a cartel of the leading industrialised nations to enforce an embargo on supplies to India. After the Pokhran test, under the U.S.-British initiative the notorious London Club was set up to deny equipment which can be used in nuclear technology. The discriminatory NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] regime has been consistently opposed by India. That is why India is "a thorn in the side of the West". India's missile programme, aside from strengthening India's security, places India in a position to persuade others to negotiate a nuclear-disarmament treaty. Meanwhile, India must continue with its national endeavour for technological self-reliance.

IRAN

Foreign Minister Velayati Addresses Geneva Disarmament Conference

LD050710

[Cross-reference] Tehran IRNA in English at 0915 GMT on 5 July 1989 carries 900-word report on a speech made by Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati on 4 July 1989 to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. For the text of IRNA's report, see the FBIS Daily Report: NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA, FBIS-NES-89-127, 5 July 1989, pages 41-42.

IRAQ

Reports on Nuclear, Chemical Warheads Denied

JN0307092089 Baghdad INA in Arabic
0745 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] Baghdad, 3 Jul (INA)—Culture and Information Minister Latif Nusayyif Jasim has strongly refuted allegations and falsehoods propagated against Iraq by Western and American media organs—the latest of which was the NBC television station—about Iraq's alleged intention to produce nuclear and chemical warheads for its missiles. In a statement to INA, the Iraqi minister affirmed that Iraq neither has the potential nor the intention to produce nuclear warheads for its missiles. Neither, he added, does Iraq have any intention to produce chemical warheads for its missiles.

Jasim warned that this cunning campaign aims at covering up an aggressive act through which Israel will continue its intransigence and embark on a serious adventure against Iraq. He added that Iraq is aware of the cunning purpose of what is being published in the American media.

The culture and information minister stressed that Iraq needs only conventional weapons to defend itself and its sovereignty. He reiterated that Iraq realizes the cunning purposes of the reports being published in the American media organs, which propagate them in the occupied territory on a large scale, and realizes those who stand behind them.

Jasim recalled the previous warnings made by Iraqi officials in response to these attempts. He said: All parties that are preparing aggressive schemes against Iraq must study these warnings carefully.

Criteria of Military-Strategic Parity, Sufficiency

52000040 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 4, Feb 89 pp 18-24

[Article by Col V. Strebkov, candidate of philosophical sciences and lecturer, under "A Scientist's Opinion" rubric: "Criteria of Military Strategic Parity"]

[Text] The fundamental and truly revolutionary changes in our own house demanded qualitatively new approaches to international affairs. The new political thinking based on the realities of the nuclear age and the priority of common human interests is finding more and more understanding and support in world public opinion and by leading figures of many states. We are seeing the gradual collapse of the stereotypes of anti-Sovietism and of the groundless conjectures of imperialist propaganda about the "Soviet military threat."

Among the many steps being taken on the basis of the new thinking, an important role is assigned to the reduction of the level of military strategic parity (balance) between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, which expresses a significant part of the balance of interests of the sides. Today this problem is already being put on a practical plane, as indicated by the INF Treaty. Next is a possible agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent. The prospect of a reduction of conventional armed forces and arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is also quite realistic. The speech by M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations and his declaration of the decision of the Soviet Union on a unilateral reduction of its armed forces and conventional arms provided a new impulse here.

All of this requires the scientific substantiation of the questions of security in the changing situation and the identification of clear criteria for military parity.

It should be noted from the outset that in the current stage there is not only an urgent need but also considerable difficulties in the determination of the criteria of parity. These difficulties issue, in the first place, from the very structure of the military balance. It is a matter of different military strategic systems with by no means identical tactical and technical data. All of the elements of the military balance are interrelated and interdependent, which makes it much more difficult to put them on the same basis. Secondly, there are difficulties in the different geostrategic position of the sides. Thirdly, difficulties arise through the dynamic development of military equipment. There is a process of the continual rejection of old types and the appearance of new ones. And although new systems for armed hostilities are being introduced on the basis of old systems, assessments of parity nevertheless change, become more profound and multivariant and require substantial and qualitative approaches.

In speaking of the difficulties in determining precise criteria for the balance of military forces of the USSR and United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO, we note that this is even more valid as applied to the correlation of conventional forces and arms in Europe. In contrast to the strategic nuclear forces, where there is a certain uniqueness of their combat tasks and relatively few hypothetical scenarios for their application, here we are dealing with a more complex spectrum of arms (hundreds of systems with a rather indefinite degree of equivalence). It is also necessary to compare the conventional armed forces of the opposing sides and find comparable criteria for them.

It is even more necessary to take into account geostrategic and many other factors. It is a matter of the development of an equation not just of two powers but of more than 20 states.

It is quite obvious that the development of the criteria of military strategic parity is an extremely necessary matter but it is hardly a simple one. What are needed are indicators that would provide a basis for the measurement of the correlation of forces of socialism and capitalism at all levels and "floors." In the military-technical aspect—from the current irrational level to the minimum level of reasonable sufficiency. In geostrategic terms—from the European or Asian-Pacific region to the overall world level.

What must these criteria be? They can be quantitative as well as qualitative.

The primarily quantitative approach to the evaluation of the correlation of the forces of the sides had priority importance in the first stage after the general recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union had achieved military strategic parity with the United States as early as the beginning of the 1970's. To a certain extent, this was quite justified. It is well known that quantitative analysis plays a huge role in knowledge. And when the USSR and United States sat down to the negotiating table, they scrupulously counted the number of strategic delivery systems and nuclear warheads on both sides.

The advantages of the qualitative approach were utilized in reaching the SALT I and SALT II agreements as well as in the current negotiations on the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. The existence of strategic parity is confirmed by the following quantitative indicators for the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and United States: the Soviet Union has somewhat more delivery systems (2,494 for the USSR, 2,260 for the United States), whereas the United States continues to have significantly more warheads on them (the USSR has approximately 10,000, the United States 14,000 to 16,000). But it is precisely the warheads that have the destructive capability and not the delivery systems themselves. Overall there is an approximate balance.

As for the quantitative aspects of the correlation of forces in Europe, the military balance here is composed, as everyone knows, of imbalance and asymmetries. At the same time, as the Declaration of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact Member States on 30 January 1989 points out, the military balance in Europe taking into account all of its components can be characterized as approximate parity.

The opponents of a balanced approach to the reduction of the level of military confrontation are speculating on the themes of "excessive armament" and the "advantages" of the USSR and Warsaw Pact in quantitative and geostrategic aspects. This gave rise to unconstructive demands by the West on the unilateral elimination of the "overwhelming superiority of the Russians" in practically all types of conventional arms and forces stationed in Europe. The decision of the Soviet Union on the reduction of its armed forces by 500,000 men in the next 2 years knocked the ground out from under speculation of this kind. The reduction will amount to 12 percent of the strength of the armed forces.

Sensible politicians and military people in the West assess our initiatives positively. At the same time, NATO leaders are continuing to assert that even after carrying out such a reduction "the Warsaw Pact will still have a great advantage in conventional armed forces in Europe." It is quite obvious that certain militant circles in NATO are distorting the true picture and are making quantitative methods absolute.

Meanwhile, the quantity of arms and armed forces has long since exceeded the scope of the measures necessary by the opposing sides. This quantity developed into a qualitative state that permits the destruction of civilization many times over. Today there is a greatly increased danger from conventional weapons. For the destructive consequences of war using conventional weapons became practically comparable with the results of nuclear war. War using conventional forces only, if unleashed, can be disastrous for Europe, considering the high population density and the presence in its territory of a large number of nuclear power plants, chemical enterprises, large-scale hydroelectric stations and other facilities representing a great danger to the lives of people in the event of their destruction.

Thus, the continuation of the arms race has long ago become senseless. The new political thinking makes it possible to explain this precisely. It requires not a quantitative but a qualitative assessment of the military strategic balance.

In our view, the qualitative criteria of the strategic balance of the sides should be understood to be indicators that would give a comprehensive characterization of its essence and content.

Proceeding from this, parity is sometimes understood to be the achievement of such a qualitative state in the

correlation of the military forces of the USSR and United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO that guarantees the possibility of inflicting unacceptable losses on the aggressor in a counterstrike.

The capability of inflicting unacceptable losses on an aggressor is an objective factor in strategic stability in the relations between the two sides. At the same time, today the level of the capability to inflict such losses is, according to various assessments, more than sufficient. In the article "Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World," M.S. Gorbachev noted: "Soviet and American scientists recently made a special study of the question of the interrelationship between strategic stability and the size of the nuclear arsenals and came to the common opinion that 95 percent of all nuclear arms of the United States and USSR could be eliminated without in any way violating stability. The argument against the strategy of 'nuclear deterrence,' which gives rise to a mad logic, is fatal. We think that there is no need to keep the 5 percent either. And then there will be a qualitatively different stability." The current conclusion about the suicidal policy of the aggressor flows from such a reality. There would be neither victors nor vanquished in a global nuclear conflict.

The irrational level of military confrontation indicates that within certain limits the military power of one of the sides can change in the direction of a quantitative reduction without violating the qualitative state of military balance and without lowering the level of security of the state. This position is reflected in different ways in the consciousness of the Soviet people. In the course of a study of the attitudes of the Soviet public by the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, for example, it was determined that 5 to 7 percent of those questioned think that there is no need for the Soviet Union to be as strong as the United States. More specific questions reveal the logic of such an approach: inasmuch as the nuclear power of the East as well as the West allows them to destroy one another many times over with certainty, the scrupulous maintenance of the equality of strength is senseless and will only slow the disarmament process. Analogous opinions have repeatedly been stated in the pages of several of our press organs. At the same time, 70 to 80 percent of Soviet citizens favor an equality of strength between the USSR and the United States. This indicates that our public is aware of the indisputable fact that security must be equal for both sides.

There is now discussion in our press about our actions in response to the arms race undertaken by the United States after the establishment of parity in the 1970's. Some authors assert that we always acted correctly, whereas others subject some of our actions to doubt. It is possible that in this stage we should not have acted under the principle of "action-reaction-counterreaction-action" but that it was above all necessary to undertake a weighed analysis of the achieved level of equilibrium. But the consequences of the achievement of military strategic parity between the USSR and the United States were not

analyzed in depth and comprehensively. In the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's, we were clearly too direct in our response to the arms race unleashed by the West. We should have shown more initiative in finding political means, have been more energetic about attracting the peace-loving public to our side, and have been more convincing in showing the danger of the arms race. Such work was done, of course, but it is clear today that there were not enough specific steps taken that would have been understood by millions of honest people on the planet and would have received their support.

Thus, the unacceptability of nuclear damage is the necessary qualitative criterion of parity. But the current level of confrontation is a balance of fear. It cannot be viewed as an adequate condition for equal security in relations between the USSR and the United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO. Another extremely important qualitative criterion—reasonable sufficiency for defense—can meet such requirements.

Sufficiency as an indicator of the correlation of forces has a multidimensional significance. It can be defensive and reasonable as well as offensive (that is, be understood as military superiority). It is precisely in this last sense that many in the West are still treating sufficiency. The term "sufficiency" has long been in use in NATO countries.

In essence there, this means not equal security for the sides but the striving to upset the military balance. Proceeding from such a false premise, a star wars program is being developed and they are planning the "compensation" and "modernization" of arms. In striving at all costs to support the decayed myth of the "Soviet military threat" and to curb the process of lowering the level of the military balance, the propaganda machine of the West is picking up speed. British Secretary of State for Defense George Younger recently declared the following: "The Soviet efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons from Europe are more of a threat to our security than a strengthening of trust on the continent." Reports have appeared in the American press to the effect that the U.S. Strategic Air Command is finishing the elaboration of a draft new operational plan for the waging of nuclear war under the conditions after the signing of the INF Treaty. Based on the fact that new weapon systems are appearing in the Pentagon arsenals, the plan also specifies new targets for strikes in the territory of the USSR. In turn, the Congressional Budget Office put together a report that examines several possible versions for the improvement of the NATO armed forces during the time after the INF Treaty went into effect. Such an understanding of sufficiency, of course, has nothing whatsoever to do with the concepts "reasonable" or "defensive."

As for our literature, it has different points of view on reasonable sufficiency as an essential criterion of parity. Some authors are proposing the abandonment of the race to maintain parity imposed on us by the West, a parity

that is treated as the quantitative equality of the military power of the sides (see: A. Adamovich, and G. Shakhnazarov, "New Thinking and Inertia of the Process," *DRUZHBA NARODOV*, No 6, 1988). Others assert that because parity is bipolar, the limit of sufficiency is determined by the United States and NATO. It can be raised, which is a countermeasure to the increase in the military potential of the other side (see: P. Skorodenko, "Military Parity and the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency," *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*, No 10, 1987).

In the first case, the authors, pointing out the necessity of renouncing the understanding of sufficiency as quantitative equality, do not reveal possible versions of our actions in response to the arms race in the countries of the West. In the second approach, the understanding of sufficiency is essentially predetermined by the actions of the other side. But as everyone knows from the history of the achievement of military strategic parity, by no means do we always have adequate justification for copying the actions of the other side. The current level of the balance of nuclear potentials is so high that it creates an equal danger for each side. The continuation of the arms race inevitably increases the military risk and can increase it to the point where even parity will cease to "work" as a factor for the military-political deterrence of imperialist aggression.

An essential criterion of sufficiency for strategic nuclear forces in the current stage is the capability not to allow an unpunished nuclear attack against our country under any circumstances, even the most unfavorable. And clearly this must be understood under defensive sufficiency. Consequently, today it is necessary to talk about raising the viability of that part of nuclear forces that is necessary to inflict unacceptable losses on the aggressor in a counterstrike. Symmetrical as well as asymmetrical actions are possible here.

With respect to time, this measure is indeed dictated to a considerable degree by the opposing side and by its attitude toward nuclear deterrence as a principle. In contrast to us, the West has not yet renounced nuclear deterrence. As then Secretary of State G. Shultz declared at the end of last year, "until some alternative system of security becomes feasible, we must continue to rely on nuclear means of deterrence. Our objective in the foreseeable future must be to strengthen nuclear deterrence and its effectiveness at the lowest and most secure force levels."

Nevertheless, in giving priority to political means, it is important to strive along with the other side to lower the military balance to the lowest possible level, from which nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction must be fully excluded. Only then will sufficiency be truly reasonable.

As for our side, the concept of sufficiency has already been made the basis of the program for the formation of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact as a whole. The

major steps taken in the reduction of our armed forces in Europe and Asia are convincing evidence of this.

By 1991, six tank divisions (5,000 tanks) will be withdrawn from the GDR, CSSR and Hungary and disbanded. It is planned to reduce the troops in these countries by 50,000 men. The personnel strength and number of arms in the European part of the Soviet Union are also subject to reduction. Altogether the Soviet Armed forces will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft in this part of the USSR and in the territory of our European allies. During these 2 years, there will also be a significant reduction of the grouping of the USSR Armed Forces in the Asian part of the country. In agreement with the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, a significant part of the Soviet forces temporarily located there will return to their homeland.

These are our approaches to reasonable sufficiency. The United States and NATO are still not responding adequately to the unilateral actions of the USSR. It appears that it is becoming more and more clear to world public opinion where policy is inspired by reason and where it is inspired by madness. And it is obvious that the unilateral steps of the Soviet Union in this area are greatly complicating the maneuvers of the supporters of the continuation of the arms race in the West.

With the increasing mutual interest in the problem of reducing the level of military confrontation and with the advancement of the concept of reasonable sufficiency for defense, such a criterion of the factual parity of the sides as the qualitative structure of the armed forces and arms of the USSR and the United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO is more and more clearly becoming paramount.

The noticeable improvement of the relations between the West and the East has greatly intensified the discussion of the structure of parity, especially in the area of the balance of conventional forces and arms. Militaristic forces, distorting the essence of the matter, keep talking about the supposed offensive nature of the structure of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and about the defensive nature of that of NATO.

In trying to prove what cannot be proved, NATO leaders are relying on a metaphysical method. For decades they have been manipulating the estimates comparing individual types of arms. Their favorite technique is speculation about the quantitative advantage of the Warsaw Pact in tanks. But what is needed for an objective evaluation of the structure of parity in Europe is not a one-sided but a comprehensive approach. In the opinion of specialists, it is now not so much tanks that personify the offensive potential and singular strike force but strike aviation with its powerful armament, speed and large operating radius, in which NATO has the advantage. The picture is analogous in the sphere of the naval forces.

With the appearance of U.S. sea and air-based cruise missiles, the NATO threat to the Warsaw Pact flank is increasing substantially. And it is essential to exclude this threat in the disarmament process. Consequently, the potential threat arising from the excessive military power must be examined from the ground, sea and air. It is no accident that the military planning of the United States includes the "integrated battlefield" concept and operates under the well-known doctrine of "follow-on force attack," which is evidence of the striving of certain forces in NATO to maintain the "status quo" of their forward-based strike forces and systems, primarily the aircraft of the U.S. Air Force based at land airfields and on aircraft carriers.

In considering the various approaches to the existing structures, the Soviet Union invites representatives of the NATO countries to balance them, proceeding from the priority of common human values. In inviting the other side to participate in dialogue, the USSR is simultaneously demonstrating the unity of the political and military technical sides of its defensive military doctrine. Qualitative changes are already taking place in the structure of the armed forces and arms of the Warsaw Pact. All Soviet divisions still remaining in the territory of our allies are being reorganized. They are being given a different structure, which is becoming unequivocally defensive after the large-scale withdrawal of tanks from them. Assault landing and river-crossing equipment, which is associated in Western Europe with the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces, is also subject to withdrawal. It is the West's turn for action.

The human factor is an extremely important qualitative criterion in the assessment of the current correlation of forces. This problem is even more complicated and multifaceted. For it is precisely the individual who realizes the possibilities of military equipment and who has a decisive role in its utilization. Essentially, in resolving the problem of the maintenance of the military strategic balance, the human factor, in particular the personnel training level of the armed forces of the sides, is by no means always considered.

At the same time, with the formation of the new political thinking, there is a change in the relationship between class and common human interests. Whereas for a long time we gave priority to the class approach in accordance with the prescription: "Whoever is not with us, is against us," which frequently cost us dearly, now, when it is a matter of the survival of the human race and the prevention of nuclear war, common human values are becoming paramount in relations between states. And this not only does not contradict the class interests of socialism but, on the contrary, constitutes the highest expression of these interests.

Therefore, in speaking of the human factor, today it is necessary to talk not about parity but about our unquestionable superiority. This has to do primarily with the infliction of unacceptable damage to a possible aggressor

precisely in a counterstrike. The realization of a counterstrike in retaliation raises a mass of moral and psychological as well as temporal problems and requires a qualitatively new and higher level of combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR in comparison with the aggressor. Qualitative balance on the basis of reasonable sufficiency for defense does not preclude the possibility of defending our values with quantitatively smaller armed forces. This also puts greater demands on the human factor and the combat readiness of troops.

On the other hand, the strengthening of the objective interrelationships and interdependencies in the world dictates the necessity of a continuing search for ways to ensure the balance of interests on the basis of equal security of the sides. But it is well known that interests, including the fundamental interest in the survival of humanity, are manifested through the actions of people. In this connection, we are not excluding but proposing an intensification of contacts in the area of military activity. Noteworthy are the existing military ties at various levels between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. As such contacts increase, more sober assessments are made of the real level of training and professionalism of the military personnel of both sides.

Thus, after visiting our military units, high-ranking military leaders of the United States, FRG and several other NATO countries gave high marks to the professional training of Soviet military personnel. And we have evaluated the military personnel of the other side. At the same time, these are only external, empirical observations that do not reflect the essence of the problem. Here it is difficult to determine the equality or inequality of the professionalism of military personnel a priori. It appears that with the further intensification of contacts it will be necessary to resolve this problem. The preconditions for its realization are being established in the process of the reciprocal exchange of observers at Warsaw Pact and NATO exercises. It is clear that some thought must be given to how to proceed further along this path.

These are a few considerations in regard to the elaboration of the criteria of military strategic parity. Of course the author does not claim that his opinions are indisputable. Some assertions and conclusions may be controversial with respect to the formulation of the problem. For the process of the qualitative support of military strategic parity at lower and lower levels is complex, many-sided and contradictory. It is essential to see the different possibilities and alternatives for its development in historical reality. But one thing is certain. The new political thinking requires a departure from stereotypical, quantitative, and black and white evaluations of the correlation of forces of socialism and capitalism.

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Causes, Likely Consequences of WEU Revival Viewed

18160009z Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 89 pp 45-49

[Article by Georgiy Platonovich Burduli, scientific associate, Social Sciences Scientific Information Center, Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences, published as part of the section "Quarterly Review: Political Prognoses": "The Rebirth of the West European Union"]

[Text]

1. Centripetal Forces

1.1. The increase in the level of activity of the Western European Union [WEU], which had been in a state of political lethargy since its creation in 1955, is usually associated with the session of the WEU Council that was held in Rome (1984), in which defense ministers and foreign affairs ministers of all member nations participated for the first time in the 30 years the organization has been in existence. The Rome declaration opened a new chapter in the history of the WEU.

1.2. In the 1960's and 1970's, the Union's member nations were simply not prepared to make more or less independent decisions in the military area. In other words, Western Europe did not consider itself an equal partner of the United States and on the whole contented itself with a secondary role in the protection of the West's interests. The correlation between the two centers of power underwent significant changes in the 1980's, and Western Europe "matured" for the adoption of independent decisions, *inter alia*, in the military area, that did not run counter to Atlantic interests but that also were not entirely subordinate to Washington's will. Such evolution of the West European approach to defense problems would seem to be not only the consequence of objective circumstances but also the result of American pressure intended to force West European countries to increase their spending on NATO.

1.3. American pressure has been expressed in all manner of forms—from traditional intimidation about the "Soviet menace" to attempts by Congress to question the feasibility of the American military presence in Western Europe. While in the first half of the 1970's, such sentiments were to a certain degree tinged with liberalism and based on the attempt to revise obligations to NATO in favor of internal priorities (for example, Senator M. Mansfield's amendments in 1971 and 1974), in the second half of the 1970's, there was a move to the right and the dominant trend was to advise allies to "do more than they are doing now" (Nunn-Bartlett Report, 1976-1977).

In 1984, Democratic Senator S. Nunn sponsored a bill calling for the partial reduction in American military personnel in Europe if the allies did not increase their

contribution to NATO's defense expenditures. And even though the Senate rejected Nunn's idea, 41 senators voted for the amendment, which should have served as a warning to the allies. H. Kissinger's famous article on plans for reforming NATO was published in early 1984. In addition to the problem of redistributing the financial and military burden, the article discussed possible structural changes (for example, Kissinger suggested appointing a West European officer Supreme Commander in Chief of Combined NATO Armed Forces in Europe and appointing an American politician Secretary General of NATO) that would make the European allies entirely responsible for supporting the activity of conventional NATO forces and would consequently raise their responsibility for the choice of means and tactics. For the sake of justice, it should be noted that such "nonisolationist" sentiments of congress and of individual experts as well did not enjoy the support (in any case, open support) of the administration. Nevertheless, pressure by congress in conjunction with other means of exerting pressure was a certain stimulus to move Western Europe in the direction of limited autonomy in the military area. It can be assumed that the revival of the WEU is a double reaction to the possibility of reducing the American military presence in Europe. First, there was the attempt by West European countries to convince Washington once more that their contribution to their own defense was quite considerable and that they were sharing this burden with the United States. Second, if the United States carries out its long-standing threat (which is unlikely if at all conceivable), Western Europe will be sufficiently integrated (and strong) in a military sense to stand up for its own interests.

1.4. The increased self-awareness of Western Europe based on the steadily growing economic and political potential of the nations in this region and the striving for self-affirmation as an equal partner in the Atlantic alliance obviously also played a part in the increase in WEU activity. In the postwar period, when NATO was created, relations between the United States and Western Europe were organized according to the formula "defender and defended," which at that time reflected the existing economic inequality. However the realities of the 1980's make this formula less indisputable.

But at the same time, when West European leaders discuss the goals and tasks of the WEU today, they do their utmost to emphasize that the increased activity of this organization and the expansion of its functions do not in any way mean that Western Europe is retreating from the principles of Atlantic cooperation. To the contrary, as if anticipating the negative reaction of Washington, they continuously emphasize that the WEU will function within the framework of the strategy coordinated within NATO but on a more independent, equal basis. Immediately after the Rome session of the WEU, G. Howe, Great Britain's secretary of state for foreign affairs, formulated the tasks of the "reborn" union as follows: "The sense of using the WEU is that the (West) Europeans themselves arrive at conclusions based on

their own analysis of interests that are acceptable to them. But the goal will be to demonstrate more graphically, *inter alia*, to our own community, that the Atlantic arch really has two supports and that one of them is truly European." An interesting detail: in an interview with the newspaper FIGARO in October 1987, A. Giraud, the erstwhile French defense minister, declared that the WEU was called upon to become "the main axis of European defense." The "axis" or one of the "supports?" It appears that the use of different terms to denote the future role of the WEU is not by chance but rather reflects the sense that these countries invest in the end result of the increased activity of the WEU.

1.5. In early 1988 the Western press published an open letter from E. Intermon (France), a high official of the WEU agency responsible for the development of cooperation in weaponry, on the known confrontation between the governments of France and Great Britain. It emphasized, in particular, that in the opinion of Paris the WEU should be used as a counterbalance to American dominance in NATO whereas London defended the thesis that the main task of the WEU is to encourage more active cooperation between West European countries in the area of weaponry, while not giving Washington the impression that it will henceforth be dealing with a "European bloc."

While it is as yet difficult to say how far these disagreements will go, it appears that they are exaggerated. While Britain unquestionably cherishes its "special relationship" with Washington, one cannot lose sight of the desire to participate in the deployment of a West European "nuclear umbrella" if only for the fear that France might otherwise be more entitled to claim the role of the leader of "European defense." On the other hand, France is the only country in Western Europe that has the triad of strategic nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear systems that is moreover not integrated in NATO's military structure—that has more freedom in its actions and that is inclined to view the WEU in the context of its ambitions as an independent nuclear power and its desire to secure the leading position in a "unified Europe."

As regards the Federal Republic of Germany, the Western European Union's abolition in 1984 of restrictions on the production of strategic bombers and long-range missiles became a notable stimulus for Bonn to take an active part in the revival of the WEU. Bilateral cooperation with France in military organizational development was probably also a factor. But on the whole, the three countries were largely (if not decisively) responsible for the revival of the Western European Union.

1.6. Returning to the reasons for the increase in the activity of the WEU, it is also necessary to give the factors that could play the part of a catalyst in this process their due. The placement of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe and President R. Reagan's announcement of the SDI program in 1983

were such factors. The deployment of Euromissiles, even though under U. S. pressure, was carried out with the consent of West European governments. At the same time, the implementation of NATO's decisions was the equivalent of lowering the "nuclear threshold" as defined by Washington. If one moreover assumes the existence of a space shield capable of protecting U. S. territory from a retaliatory strike, West European fears that the aggregate of the two programs (Euromissiles and SDI) might lead to the strategic "disuniting" of allies on different shores of the Atlantic.

1.7. Economic considerations played a definite part in the increase in the activity of West European military cooperation. The interests of West European military industrialists have been infringed for a long time despite feeble attempts to coordinate efforts in this area. Persistent disunity has prevented West European monopolies from successfully competing with their overseas partners. It is sufficient to note that the Old World still buys approximately eight times more weapons and combat equipment from the United States than it sells. While it is difficult to assume that integration within the WEU will be a panacea for all ills, it nevertheless might improve West European industrialists' prospects of getting their own military market away from the Americans.

2. NATO's 'European Pillar': Prospects for Evolution

2.1. The adoption of the "Platform of Principles of European Security" by a session of the council in The Hague in the latter part of October 1987 became what was probably the most significant event in the history of the WEU. While a number of documents were produced in the period following the Rome declaration which laid the foundation for commencing the revival of the WEU, it was nevertheless specifically in The Hague that the specific principles of future military cooperation of West European countries were formulated. The adoption of this program document was preceded by almost a year's discussion and coordination at various levels. Its main provisions were set forth in the "Charter of Principles of West European Security" by French Prime Minister J. Chirac at the WEU Assembly in December 1986.

Officially, the document was conceived as a response to the "Reykjavik challenge," i. e., the "challenge" of two great powers that, in the words of French leaders, intend to resolve problems of global disarmament without the participation of the West Europeans. In Chirac's opinion, under these conditions the Soviet Union and the United States must be forced to "listen to Europe's voice." It appears, however, that the "voice of Europe" was addressed primarily to Washington. In any event, Chirac believed that "such a demarche would be beneficial to the Atlantic alliance in which the presentation of our convictions is oftentimes fragmentary. What is more, our American allies could in their negotiations with the Soviet Union draw upon the firmer assent of European countries to the fundamental principles of mutual security."

It would seem that behind these arguments are plans that go far beyond the mere strengthening of NATO's "European pillar" and the concern for the firmness of the American position in negotiations with the USSR. The issue is the total political, economic, and military unification of West European countries. Essentially it is the creation of a new European structure that envisages qualitatively different military interrelations between seven West European countries compared with those that exist within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance.

2.2. France's age-old striving to preserve its independence on defense policy issues and, if possible, to head the movement for the "Europeanization" of the Old World's defenses is common knowledge. It is therefore not surprising that France was the initiator of the creation of a "European defense." Nor is it by chance that the "Charter of Principles of West European Security" contained two key points: (a) the need for West European countries to create powerful armed forces equipped with conventional arms which in their effectiveness approximate tactical nuclear arms; and (b) the necessity of preserving France's and Great Britain's nuclear forces which in the event of the American withdrawal from Western Europe will remain the sole means of "intimidating the aggressor." French leaders have as a rule buttressed their arguments with references to the preparation of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty. Nor have they lost sight of the prospects of a nuclear-free Europe and finally, as a consequence of everything that has been said above, the possibility of the considerable weakening of strategic ties between Western Europe and the United States.

French diplomatic efforts were ultimately crowned with success even though some West European countries, Italy in particular, initially adopted a restrained stance concerning the "charter." It was also characteristic that the document was approved in October 1987, i. e., when the INF Treaty, despite a brief postponement of the summit meeting, had become a virtual reality. Thus, the arguments advanced by France fell on receptive soil and bore fruit all the more so because the concern over the imperfections of "European pillar" were shared by many West Europeans. Following a session of the WEU Council in Luxembourg (April 1987) that ended without producing any results, F. Bonnar, the publisher of NATO'S SIXTEEN NATIONS, wrote in particular: "Growing dependence irritates the Europeans at the same time that the lack of control over their own strategic nuclear potential in the alliance encourages immature reactions. It is specifically such feelings that can provide the impetus to revive the WEU."

The document proposed by J. Chirac was initially called a "charter," but the session of the WEU Council in The Hague approved the "Platform of Principles of European Security." Commenting on the results of the session in The Hague, the French press maintained that the only substantive difference between the two documents was

terminological since all of the prime minister's points had supposedly been taken into account by WEU member nations. However, there is also another point of view. In the opinion of H. van den Broek, Netherlands minister of foreign affairs, this "platform" is something less than the more obligatory "charter" that "France wanted and that—it was thought—might cause Washington to wonder about [Western] Europe's commitment to NATO." Thus, in one way or another, the "platform" will hardly give Washington such a basis—after all, the text unequivocally states that the West Europeans "intend to strengthen the European basis of the alliance" and that the "security of the alliance is indivisible."

2.3. After adopting the "platform," defense ministers and foreign affairs ministers of WEU countries essentially articulated the principles on which the collective defense of Western Europe must be based, specifically: maintaining combat effectiveness at a level that will restrain any aggression or that will serve as a counterweight to the threat of aggression; the combination of nuclear and conventional forces on the premise that the nuclear component is the only means capable of confronting a potential aggressor with the threat of a risk that is unacceptable to him; the necessity of the considerable presence of American (nuclear and conventional) forces in Western Europe; the principal role is assigned to West European conventional and nuclear arms.

2.4. Among these principles, particular mention should be made of nuclear deterrence, the exceptional role of which is unequivocally emphasized in the document. There is discussion of the deployment of the West European "nuclear umbrella" based on the French and British strategic potential. This decision heralds a qualitatively new approach to deterrence strategy in Europe and will unquestionably be reinforced by the appropriate material base. The expansion of French and British nuclear forces is planned even now. What is more, the French Parliament's commission on defense has suggested discussing with Great Britain the possibility of developing long-range cruise missiles; the possibility of the joint development and production of nuclear weapons is being explored. A proper place in the "platform" is assigned to such tasks in the organizational development of powerful conventional armed forces, to the WEU's attitude toward crises outside Europe, to arms control, and to the East-West dialogue.

2.5. Official Washington's reaction to the decision made in The Hague was positive. In a televised speech on 4 November 1987, President R. Reagan expressed satisfaction over the approval of the "platform" which in his opinion would give hitherto unprecedented impetus to the bolstering of NATO's "European pillar." Such an evaluation is especially characteristic against the background of the earlier U. S. attitude toward the activity of the WEU. No later than 1985, R. Burt, assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, warned WEU leaders against searching for a general approach to arms control problems outside NATO. For now, it is

difficult to imagine that the WEU would soon become an independent entity in arms control negotiations, but it is also impossible to say the reverse with certainty, particularly because there is a section of the "platform" that entirely admits such a possibility. (The report of the Committee on Defense to the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, which rejected NATO's claim that the Warsaw Treaty Organization had the preponderance of non-nuclear forces, can be considered the first, rather timid attempt at an independent approach to disarmament problems. The report evoked the undisguised irritation of high-ranking NATO military officials.

In one way or another, there was no hue and cry from Washington even though the latter is still skeptical about the WEU. Nor is the possibility excluded that the WEU's present activity will serve as a catalyst triggering congressional sentiment to reduce the American military presence in Western Europe.

2.6. The question of expanding the composition of the WEU, primarily through the incorporation of countries on the Pyrenees Peninsula was placed on the agenda of that organization following the conclusion of the Rome session. Initially, the Portuguese leadership viewed joining the WEU as a logical continuation of plans for economic and political integration in the Common Market. Then things came to something of a standstill evidently because of the need to adopt very serious obligations. At the same time, Portugal had never occupied antinuclear positions and had not refused to participate in the nuclear strategy of its allies. Moreover, joining the WEU promised certain political and economic advantages that ultimately proved decisive. While the situation with Spain was more complex because of that country's nonnuclear status, considerations favoring total integration in the West European community and the interests of that country's military industry—one of the largest exporters of weapons—played their role.

Differences in the positions of Portugal and Spain were graphically manifested when their foreign affairs ministers signed protocols of their entry into the WEU. Portuguese minister J. de Deus Pinheiro declared his full support for the WEU's principles and goals; F. Fernandez-Ordonez, his Spanish colleague, was forced to make significant qualifications. While recognizing the NATO strategy of nuclear deterrence on the whole, Spain confirmed its position relative to the prohibition on the placement, stockpiling, and introduction of nuclear weapons in the nation. N. Serra, Spain's defense minister, in turn, noted that Madrid did not intend to send its military units beyond its national borders and resolutely spoke out against contributing to the expansion of the naval presence of West European countries in the Persian Gulf.

The expansion of the composition of the WEU is not a simple arithmetic action (a "seven" becoming a "nine"),

but is a qualitative change with all the attendant consequences. First, the WEU now embraces NATO's southern front, which from a geographical standpoint has already become a real "European pillar." What is more, the ground is created for discussing problems of military integration in the EC: after all 9 out of 12 members of this organization belong to the WEU. Nor was it by chance that a top Portuguese official expressed the confidential opinion that Portugal views the WEU not so much as NATO's "European pillar" as the EC's "military pillar." Finally, the entry of Spain and Portugal into the WEU may fan the arms race in the Mediterranean and this is fraught with dangerous consequences.

2.7. The time has come for WEU member nations to implement the plans that were formulated in that organization's basic documents. The basic direction of development of the WEU is the extension of European integration to the military-industrial sphere. The future of the continent, the prospects of arms control, the dialogue between East and West, and, of course, Atlantic relations depend in large measure on the implementation of these plans.

Disagreements between France and Great Britain concerning NATO were discussed above. There appear to be real signs that France (at least certain circles in that country) is ready to go so far as to transform the WEU into a military political organization that is practically independent of NATO. REPUBLIQUE, the journal of the French Socialist Party, published an article by a group of officers and diplomats under the pseudonym, stating that the thesis of "flexible response" is dead and that NATO no longer has any strategy because this

organization no longer has the arms to implement its strategy. Further, on the basis of certain assumptions (for example, substantial progress in the elimination of conventional weapons, the attainment of "equilibrium at the lowest level," the exclusion of any possibility of a surprise attack, and the transition to the formula of "defensive defense"), the conclusion is drawn that the obsolescence of the mechanisms that ensure American leadership (military and consequently political as well) in Europe will become obvious and that the way will be open to the unification of the conventional forces of European countries, France and West Germany first of all, under integrated command that will be not American but European; the choice of such a formula could be carried out under the aegis of a stronger, expanded Western European Union (NATO's "European pillar"). While the text makes formal mention of "European pillar," the discussion is essentially about a new military bloc independent of NATO, the creation of which in the event of the implementation of the measures enumerated above would appear anachronistic.

The WEU development program formulated in the platform also appears to be contradictory. While it contains a provision about the necessity of continuing the Helsinki process with the aim of overcoming the division of Europe, the development of military integration within the framework of WEU will not help to overcome this division and cannot serve the interests of building the "common European home."

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1989.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

European Nuclear Disarmament Meeting Opens in Madrid

LD0607153489 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish
1000 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] The Eighth European Convention for Nuclear Disarmament, which is being held in Vitoria in the Basque Country until 9 July, started today with 1 minute of silence in memory of the Chinese students killed in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Taking part in the opening session are Laszlo Major, spokesman of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee; Major Britt Theorin, Swedish special ambassador for Disarmament; a representative of the African National Congress; and the Vitoria Mayor Jose Angel Cuerda. Some 250 speakers from 50 countries will take part in this convention.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD Experts Make Proposals on Security Strategy

LD0607131289 Hamburg DPA in German 1024 GMT
6 Jul 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The military potentials of NATO and the Warsaw Pact should each be reduced in Europe to 50 percent of the present NATO potential. This is the central demand in a paper entitled "European Security 2000—Thoughts on an Overall Strategy for the Security of Europe from the Social Democratic Viewpoint." The strategy, which was drawn up by the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] disarmament experts Egon Bahr, Andreas von Buelow, and Karsten Voigt, also proposes security zones of about 100 km both sides of the borders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in which forces will be thinned out even further.

Explaining the paper to the press in Bonn today, Bahr and Voigt stressed that in order to make war in Europe impossible, conventional and nuclear forces of both pact systems would have to be reduced to the level of incapacity for attack. Their proposal is that in the final state both sides will have between the Atlantic and the Urals at most 9,500 tanks, 2,100 armored personnel carriers, 21,020 infantry military vehicles, 8,850 cannons, mortars, and rocket launchers, and 764 helicopter battleships and antitank helicopters.

Strategic bombers should remain a matter for the superpowers and should be dealt with within the framework of the so-called START negotiations. A zero solution should be agreed for medium-range bombers, fighter-bombers should be gradually abolished, and equal ceilings should be agreed for fighters. Air bases should in general be prohibited within the security zones near the

borders. Parallel to the Vienna negotiations on conventional stability, there should be agreement on the abolition of all tactical nuclear weapons, including battlefield weapons.

Bahr stressed that this strategy, which had been worked out over 4 months, demanded the continuation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, including the "physical presence" of the United States in Europe. Of course the present NATO strategy of "flexible response" would no longer function and would have to be changed. This strategy is "not a sacred cow," however, said the SPD politician. "My aim is not the intactness of NATO strategy, but the indestructible security of Europe." There is also agreement among the SPD experts that conscription should continue in the FRG, even if the Federal Army is drastically reduced.

According to Bahr, the initiative for drawing up the strategy was given by Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives Les Aspin at the beginning of the year at a discussion with members of the SPD Lower House group. Bahr announced that he and Voigt will fly to Washington this weekend to explain the paper to Aspin. The paper is also to be communicated to other socialist parties in West Europe and to counterparts in East Europe. This "realistic model," Bahr said, will enliven the international debate.

Further on Allegations of CW Materiel Sale to Iran

'Bonn Claims Ignorance'

AU0307075989 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 1 Jul 89 p 1

[Martin Winter report: "Bonn Claims Ignorance"]

[Text] Bonn, 30 June—In Bonn it is unclear whether the illegal shipment of 250 tonnes of thionyl chloride by the Duesseldorf "Rheineisen" company to Iran has been stopped or not. On Friday [30 June] there were contradictory reports on this matter. Walter Prax, spokesman of the FRG Finance Ministry, claimed that the cargo ship which transports the poison that is produced in India had left Bombay. According to other information, the shipment has already arrived in Dubayy to be reloaded to an Iranian ship.

According to its own reports, the FRG Government still does not know the name of the ship, to whom it belongs, or under which flag it is operating. Even though it is known that the ship belongs to a German shipping company, Friedrich Zimmermann's Transportation Ministry does not feel responsible. The ministry's spokeswoman justified this by saying that the ship is operating under a foreign flag. For the Foreign Ministry, spokesman Juergen Chrobog said that "all diplomatic channels" will be used to prevent the delivery.

According to information gained by FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has asked Dubayy's ambassador to Bonn to come to the Foreign Ministry. He and Dubayy's foreign minister were informed about Bonn's urgent interest in preventing the chemicals from reaching Iran.

Even though the Duesseldorf public prosecutor has been investigating "Rheineisen" since Wednesday [28 June] and has seized a large amount of documents, on Friday [30 June] the Bonn Justice Ministry spokesman was not able to give any information about the details of the deal, the companies involved, or the delivery conditions. Dealing with this affair involves "completely normal investigations by the public prosecutor," he said.

DER SPIEGEL Report

AU0307105789 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
3 Jul 89 pp 57-58

[Unattributed report: "Wrong Use"]

[Text] The foreign minister was fed up. Every few months, Hans Dietrich Genscher complained last week, the Americans "confront" the FRG Government "with the criminal activities of some companies" and this is then "even brought to the attention of highest level of government."

Genscher felt personally exposed. Only 6 months after the U.S. Administration published the Libyan poison-gas connection of German entrepreneurs, it has again exposed the FRG as the Eldorado of shady businessmen.

Washington reportedly has information that German enterprises are involved "in advising Iran concerning the delivery of primary products for the manufacture of chemical weapons," U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told his Bonn colleague Genscher in Washington the week before last. The connection that was discovered by the U.S. intelligence service leads to Rheineisen Chemical Products in Duesseldorf.

Genscher had hardly been briefed and a telex just sent by the German Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Ministry, when the people in Bonn were reading the most important details in THE NEW YORK TIMES—exactly as happened in January when the scandal around the Libyan poison-gas plant in Al-Rabitah broke.

Foreign Minister Genscher is not the only one among the Bonn leadership who is outraged about having again been duped by the Americans. In the Chancellor's Office the actions of the Americans were called "impossible": "This is a good instrument to fan anti-Americanism in our country," one of Kohl's advisers said.

Warned by the Al-Rabitah affair, when the FRG Government misled the public with disinformation for weeks, acted with great restraint against the poison dealers of Imhausen Chemie, and then had to face very

harsh and embarrassing questions in the Bundestag, Bonn reacted quickly this time, without waiting too long for information that "would hold up in court."

On Wednesday [28 June] the Duesseldorf public prosecutor started investigations against the managers of Rheineisen Chemical Products for violating the Foreign Trade Law. A purchasing contract, which was concluded on 1 June 1989 and was found by police during a search of the Rheineisen offices, confirmed the accusations of the Americans: For \$269,436 the company intended to ship 257 tonnes of thionyl chloride, a primary product for the manufacture of the neural agent mustard gas, which was produced in India, to Iran.

At the last moment, Bonn tried to use all diplomatic means to prevent the delivery of the hot goods: The first part of the shipment, which was taken from Bombay to Dubayy by the German container ship "Seacrest Pioneer," should not reach Bandar Abbas, its port of destination, under any circumstances.

The German investigators quickly realized who was to receive the poison-gas chemicals. "Even though it is not the client," an internal note of the Bonn Finance Ministry says, "the Iranian Defense Ministry is involved in the deal."

The Rheineisen files show that the Iranian military was up to bigger things: When the Duesseldorf office of the Iranian state-owned "Defense Industries Organization" (D.I.O.) company established contact with Rheineisen at the beginning of 1989, it offered a deal for millions of Deutsche marks. The Iranians said that they need 3,400 tonnes of thionyl chloride—more than 10 times as much as the delivery that has now been stopped.

Over the past years the D.I.O. Contact Office, the procurement office of the Iranian military, has made Duesseldorf the turntable of armament deals. Thus, the D.I.O. office had contacts with the Chemco export company, which has meanwhile been disbanded and whose deals have been investigated by a U.S. court in Baltimore for months. The matter under investigation is thiodiglycol, which is also a raw material for the production of mustard gas.

When the deal was revealed in spring 1988, Peter Walaschek, a German merchant, had ordered 90 tonnes of this substance in Baltimore. His dubious business partner was Sajjid Karim 'Ali Sobhani, attache of the Iranian Embassy in Bonn. Even though the Foreign Ministry gives assurances that there is "no direct connection" with the Rheineisen case, last week the FRG Government declared Sobhani persona non grata.

There are more and more indications that Iran, which was bombed with chemical weapons by its opponent Iraq during the 8-year Gulf war, is building up its own arsenal of chemical weapons—and, like Iraq, uses German aid to do this.

At the beginning of 1988, a Frankfurt installation construction company, Lurgi, was suspected of helping the mullahs. Iran had placed an order with the Germans to plan a factory for insecticides. Fearing that the factory might be used to produce chemical weapons, as the Libyan plant in Al-Rabitah was used, all European construction companies contacted shied away from the \$200-million order and Tehran had to shelve the project.

With the thionyl chloride deal, which has now been discovered, the Iranians followed the simpler route and contacted a compatriot, 38-year-old Moytaba Aschtari [spelling as published]. "Contrary to the registration in the trade register," the Duesseldorf Customs Office says, Aschtari is acting as manager at Rheineisen Chemical Products.

And contrary to his claims not to know anything about chemicals, the Iranian is not new to this business. Formerly a trade representative for German chemical companies in Iran, since the mid-1980's he has been involved in a number of small FRG companies which have been under investigation by public prosecutors because of dubious deals.

Thus, he headed Cestquill Limited, a small company in Oberursel. According to investigators, the company, which went bankrupt last spring, exported the highly toxic substance cyanide of potassium from Romania under strange conditions—an accusation that is denied by the Iranian. Aschtari had also long been a shareholder of the Oberursel Omtea company, which mainly dealt with the export of sensitive substances—such as pesticides, agrochemicals, and primary products of the chemical industry—before it went bankrupt in 1987. The Frankfurt public prosecutor is investigating Aschtari, who left Omtea in 1986, for fraudulent bankruptcy.

Omtea, on the other hand, is linked with D.A. Dampf Trading Limited, a company which has its seat in Schmitten near Oberursel and which became conspicuous in February 1988: At that time, Netherlands customs officials confiscated a shipment of 289 pounds of ammonium perchlorate, a basic substance for the production of rocket fuel, in Rotterdam port on an Iranian ship. Belgian customs officials had already noticed the Schmitten company the year before when it wanted to export the same substance.

When at the beginning of 1989 Aschtari started to look around for large amounts of thionyl chloride for the Iranian deal, the clever chemicals dealer knew where to find them: This chemical substance is produced only in the United States, Japan, Switzerland, India, and the FRG—about 100,000 tonnes all over the world per year. Aschtari failed at least twice: at a Swiss company and the Leverkusen Bayer Company, where the Iranian wanted to buy 1,000 tonnes. The Swiss wrote Aschtari that they have to be sure that the substance would "not be put to

the wrong use." In India Rheineisen found what it wanted—at the Ranspek Industries Ltd in Bombay.

As of 12 April negotiating a deal for thionyl chloride in the FRG must be approved by the Eschborn Federal Economic Office; the reason for this was the Libyan affair. However, if Aschtari had not bought the thionyl chloride himself but only negotiated the deal like a broker, nothing would have happened—such deals need no permit. This mistake might cost the Iranian a term in prison of up to 3 years.

Even the new foreign trade law, which is designed to mend the foreign policy damage caused by the Al-Rabitah affair and was read for the first time and discussed in the Bundestag the week before last, does not envisage sanctions against deals arranged by brokers.

Last Wednesday, the Bonn Cabinet hastily ordered Minister of the Chancellor Rudolf Seiters to examine the amendment to the law with the responsible state secretaries. "In the future, we will also discover and punish such cases and keep them away from the FRG as a deterrent," Economics Minister Helmut Haussmann said, referring to Rheineisen.

The strong words were probably directed mainly at the United States: At the beginning of last week, the Bush administration let its friends in Bonn know—via THE NEW YORK TIMES, of course—that the United States considers the Rheineisen case as an "important test" of the Germans' willingness to "deter" their companies from deals with atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons with the Third World.

Foreign Minister Genscher Comments

AU0307092989 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
3 Jul 89 p 10

["Nea" report: "Genscher for Kohl Trip to Poland in 1989"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher refuted the view of the opposition that German-Polish negotiations have been idling mainly because of the election success of the Republicans. In the "Frankfurt Talks" program of the Hesse Radio Station he said: "The FRG Government lets itself be guided by matters of substance and not be influenced by fringe groups." [passage omitted]

In connection with the reports on German involvement in poison-gas projects in Iran, the minister does not rule out another tightening of the foreign trade law: "If it is proved that deals have been negotiated but that this cannot be punished under criminal law, then we really need another change in the law."

Shipment Expected in Bombay

*LD0307151789 Hamburg DPA in German
1411 GMT 3 Jul 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The ship chartered by the Dusseldorf firm Rheineisen Chemical Products, with a part load destined for Iran, of products which can be used for the manufacture of poison gas, is expected to return tomorrow evening to Bombay, India. This was announced by a Foreign Ministry spokesman in Bonn today. The ship, with a 120-ton load, was stopped in Dubayy.

The Dusseldorf Public Prosecutor's Office is determining whether an application for official approval has been made. The order of over 257 tons of thionyl chloride from India was financed by the procuring authorities of the Iranian arms industry. The chemical is on the list of goods requiring definite official approval in the Federal Republic.

ITALY

CSBM Chief Delegate Opposes Naval Discussions

*AU3006130989 Rome ANSA in English
1301 GMT 30 Jun 89*

[Text] (ANSA) Vienna, June 30—Measures designed to increase confidence and security in Europe cannot be extended to independent naval activities nor can exchanges of statistical information cover naval strength, according to the Italian position on these issues discussed here Friday at negotiations on confidence and security building measures [CSBM].

The head of the Italian delegation at the CSBM talks underway in Vienna, Ambassador Vieri Traxler, declared: "In response to the opposing thesis of the Eastern countries, we feel it would be useless and potentially dangerous to extend the CSBM to naval activities which, by their nature and location, are placed outside the Madrid mandate. As a consequence, we consider extending exchanges of information on naval strength, the activities of which should not be included in the CSBM regime, extraneous to the goals of our negotiations."

The delegation chief went on to say that this is, "a position based on reasoning of substance and form which makes our proposal perfectly suitable for achieving the purpose of our dealings, as defined in the concluding document of Vienna, and is in perfect conformity with the Madrid mandate."

In his statement at the talks, Traxler said that in addition to general considerations there were more specific points

which refer to Italy's geographic location and the nation's strategy and the role of its navy.

He recalled that among the various missions conducted by the Italian Navy are participation in peacekeeping operations, such as the one underway in the Sinai, and escort activities, such as the escort and mineclearing operations performed in the Gulf and the Red Sea.

"These are operations which have nothing to do with prejudicing security in Europe. If anything, they strengthen it," he said.

The delegation chief also affirmed that it would be difficult to describe the Gulf or the Red Sea as maritime areas close to Europe, in the terms of the mandate.

"Our naval force's other activities are conducted in the Mediterranean, where nine of the eighteen countries are not part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and where one of these even fired two missiles at Italy," said the ambassador.

He concluded his remarks by saying he was convinced that the Western proposals could be improved with the contribution of all so as to offer a base for a "positive and constructive" final outcome for the Vienna talks.

Foreign Minister Andreotti, NATO Chief Woerner View Summit Aftermath

*AU2906131889 Rome ANSA in English
1010 GMT 29 Jun 89*

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, June 29—Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner met here Wednesday evening [28 June] for a discussion of the aftermath of the NATO summit held in May, with special attention trained on the prospects for moving away from confrontation with the Warsaw Pact nations and towards cooperation.

A note issued by the Rome Foreign Ministry reported that Andreotti and Woerner also insisted on the importance of a quick conclusion for negotiations in Vienna on conventional forces reduction.

The Foreign Ministry stressed in this connection the timeliness of submitting new NATO proposals to the Vienna talks before the end of the present round of negotiations, scheduled for July 12.

Later in the meeting, said the note, the talk was expanded to bring in the permanent diplomatic representatives to the Atlantic Council now conducting a visit to Italy.

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